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INTRODUCTION
Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust 
laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in 
which the merging firms sell. In many of these cases the threat is that in concentrated 
markets—those with only a few sellers—the merger increases the likelihood of 
collusion or collusion-like behavior. The result will be that the post-merger firm will 
reduce the volume of sales in the affected market and prices will rise. 
Mergers can also injure competition in markets in which the firms purchase, 
however.1 Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases have 
applied the merger law to buyers.2 The fear is that firms who collectively have power 
in the market in which they buy will be able to suppress the price that they pay. Such 
exercises of “monopsony” power are mirror images of the monopoly power 
exercised in selling markets.3 The post-merger firm reduces the number of purchases 
and forces the market price down.4
 This article concerns an even more rarefied subset, and one that has received little 
attention in merger law. Nevertheless, its implications are staggering. Some mergers 
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1. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE 
L.J. 2078 (2018). 
2. See infra text accompanying note 16. 
3. On the economics of firms with market power in the markets in which they buy, see 
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (rev. ed. 
2010). 
4. See id. at 45–48. 
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may be unlawful because they injure competition in the labor market by enabling the 
post-merger firm anticompetitively to suppress wages or salaries. To the best of our 
knowledge no court has ever condemned a merger because of its anticompetitive 
effects in labor markets. 
Concentration in labor markets is very likely as high or higher than in many of 
the product markets in which firms sell.5 As a result, the antitrust law against 
anticompetitive mergers affecting employment markets is certainly underenforced, 
very likely by a significant amount. This is critical for several reasons. First, the share 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) going to labor has been declining at an alarming 
rate.6 This may result from several things, including suppression of unions and 
increasing concentration in product markets, but lax antitrust enforcement could be
an important source as well. Second, antitrust law does not condemn unilateral price 
setting by dominant firms. Rather it requires an anticompetitive exclusionary 
practice.7 As a result, a dominant firm that unilaterally sets a very high price for its 
sales or a very low price for its purchases, including purchases of labor, does not 
violate the antitrust laws. In that case, a second-best solution to the problem of 
suppressed wages is merger law, which can interdict wage-suppressing mergers 
before they occur.8 Third, under the consumer welfare principle antitrust law is 
properly directed at output reducing practices no matter what their source,9 and there 
is certainly no principled reason for excluding anti-competitive effects in labor 
markets. 
Here, we offer a first but reasonably comprehensive and empirically based 
assessment of the problem of mergers that facilitate anticompetitive wage and salary 
suppression. We analyze the empirics and consider the most likely problems that 
courts will encounter in such litigation, including market definition, assessment of 
market concentration, the role of non-compete and non-poaching agreements as 
aggravating factors for concentration, and application of the government’s Merger 
Guidelines.10 Although many of the queries that this analysis requires might seem 
unique, the principles being applied are derived entirely from well-established 
                                                                                                                
5. See infra text accompanying notes 30–35. 
6. See, e.g., David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John 
Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms 1 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23396, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23396.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y3FK-F25H]; see also David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, 
Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 
AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 180 (2017); COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, LABOR 
MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES 2 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20161025_monopsony_la
bor_mrkt_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5SV-KFHP]. The data given here indicate that the labor 
share of nonfarm income fell from 65% in 1948 to 58% in 2016. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC 
ADVISORS, supra. 
7. See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720 (4th ed. 
2015). 
8. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 45 (2018).  
9. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled? (Aug. 
28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3197329 [http://perma.cc/UF5A-67Y8].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 104–42. 
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economic doctrine and traditional antitrust rules concerning competitive harm. We 
comprehensively apply these well-established principles to purchasing rather than 
selling, and to labor rather than products. 
I. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND LABOR MARKET COMPETITION
The goal of antitrust policy toward mergers is to protect consumers from 
noncompetitive price increases or reductions in output, which can be measured by 
quantity, but also by reductions in quality or innovation.11 Under antitrust’s merger 
provision, section 7 of the Clayton Act, the court must identify some “line of 
commerce” and “section of the country”12 in which a contemplated merger threatens 
lower output and higher prices. This approach is reflected in the enforcement 
Agencies’ Horizontal Merger Guidelines.13  
The most commonly recognized competitive harm from mergers is higher prices 
charged by sellers. This does not tell the entire story, however. Mergers can also lead 
to anticompetitive output reductions resulting from diminished competition on the 
buying side of the market.14 The antitrust laws pertaining to mergers do not 
distinguish between seller side and buyer side competitive harm. Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act simply requires that the merger involve an “activity affecting 
commerce” that may “substantially . . . lessen competition” or tend to “create a 
monopoly.”15 Coverage that includes both sellers and buyers is not universal in the 
Clayton Act. For example, section 3 of the Act, which reaches anticompetitive tying 
and exclusive dealing, applies only to sales, not to purchases.16 This is also true of 
most of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, which outlaws certain 
discriminations in price between “different purchasers,” thus indicating that this 
provision applies only to sellers.17 By contrast, the Clayton Act merger law was 
drafted so as to apply to anticompetitive mergers by both sellers and buyers. 
While the use of section 7 to pursue mergers among buyers is well established, 
there is relatively little case law.18 This paper is concerned with one particular aspect 
                                                                                                                
11. See 11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1901d (4th ed. 
2018).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https:// 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/KY3N-2APJ].
14. See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 980–82 (4th 
ed. 2016). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (making it unlawful “to lease or make a sale or contract for 
sale” on the condition or understanding that the “lessee or purchaser” not deal in a competitor’s 
goods where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition); see also 11 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, ¶¶ 1801, 1803 (output contracts). 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012) (making it unlawful for a firm “to discriminate in price 
between different purchasers”). However, the Robinson-Patman Act does have a separate 
provision applying to buyers that makes it unlawful for them “knowingly to induce or receive” 
a discriminatory sale prohibited by the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f). 
18. See United States v. Cargill, No. Civ.A. 991875GK, 2000 WL 1475752 (D.D.C. June 
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of mergers that involve buyers, which is anticompetitive mergers threatening to 
suppress employee wages or salaries to infracompetitive levels. Anticompetitive 
wage suppression typically goes hand in hand with suppression of employment and 
output below the competitive level. 
Mergers affecting the labor market require some rethinking of merger policy, 
although not any altering of its fundamentals. For example, mergers that threaten 
wage suppression are horizontal when the merging firms compete in the labor 
market, and this may be true whether or not they are competitors in any product 
market.19 As we show below, one useful way to think of the extent of horizontal 
competition in the market for employees is to look at the participants in the relatively 
large number of “anti-poaching” cases that involve agreements among firms not to 
hire one another’s employees.20 This is quite consistent with the general principle of 
market definition in merger cases that a market consists of a grouping of firms that, 
if unified by a cartel, would have market power,21 or more specifically, an ideal 
collusive group.22 So if two firms agree with one another not to exchange employees 
they must be competitors in that portion of the labor market covered by the 
agreement. That would make a merger among those two firms horizontal, although 
not necessarily unlawful. Naked collusion is condemned without regard to market 
structure. By contrast, mergers that might threaten coordinated interaction are 
unlawful only if certain structural conditions are met. One of the things we do in this 
paper is identify those conditions, considering whether they should differ when we 
are addressing a buying market rather than a selling market and—more 
particularly—when that buying market involves labor. 
                                                                                                                
30, 2000) (consent decree) (grain purchasers); United States v. Aetna, No. 3-99 CV 1398-H, 
1999 WL 1419046 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999) (health care operations); United States v. Pennzoil 
Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (granting preliminary injunction). On the case law 
generally, see 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 14 (mergers among buyers). 
The flip side of the oligopsony issue is that powerful buyers can serve to discipline the 
higher sales prices of the post-merger firm. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 
VA. L. REV. 1369 (1991); see also Cory Capps, Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers, 6 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 375 (2010); Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 775 (2012).  
19. See infra text accompanying notes 119–23. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 129–32. 
21. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 530 (4th ed. 
2014); Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133 
(2012). 
22. See Kenneth D. Boyer, Industry Boundaries, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
LAW 70, 73–74 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, eds., 2d ed. 1988) (relevant market is “ideal 
collusive group”); Gregory J. Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipments Data in Defining 
Geographic Markets, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 719, 721 (1981) (“A market for antitrust purposes
is any product or group of products and any geographic area in which collective action by all 
firms (as through collusion or merger) would result in a profit maximizing price that 
significantly exceeded the competitive price.”); Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust 
Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123 (1992) (on development of concept of relevant 
antitrust market as collusive group). 
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To illustrate the difference between collusive groups that involve products and 
those that involve labor, consider eBay, Inc., and Intuit, Inc.23 A federal district court 
approved an antitrust settlement in a state’s federal antitrust challenge to a labor 
“non-poaching” agreement between these firms.24 Intuit’s principal products are 
TurboTax, a popular income tax preparation program, and Quickbooks, a popular 
business program for bookkeeping and accounting. By contrast, eBay is a popular 
online auction site, which is not in the business of producing and selling software. 
Looking at the product side, a merger between eBay and Intuit would very likely be 
quickly approved. The firms appear not to be substantial competitors in any market 
in which they sell products or services. Nevertheless, the two firms found it profitable 
to agree with one another not to poach each other’s “specialized computer engineers 
and scientists.”25
The fact that the two firms found it profitable to enter into this agreement is a 
strong indicator that (1) the firms were competitors in this particular portion of the 
labor market and (2) that between the two of them they had enough market power to 
make the agreement profitable. For example, if two out of ten equivalent firms agreed 
to divide a market the agreement would be unprofitable because the remaining eight 
would be free to compete as they pleased. They would steal workers from any cartel 
member who sought to decrease its wage. Successful collusion requires that the 
colluding firms in the aggregate have a sufficient share of the market so that their 
own agreement cannot quickly be offset by the actions of their competitors.26 As a 
result, a merger between eBay and Intuit should invite very close scrutiny in this 
particular section of the labor market. This section of the market would also qualify 
as a “line of commerce” under section 7 of the Clayton Act, and a challenger need 
identify only one such section in which anticompetitive results would be 
substantially likely to occur.27 If they were the only firms in this particular labor 
market, this would be a merger to monopoly, which is almost always unlawful. 
This paper examines a number of issues that are relevant to merger challenges in 
employment markets, focusing on the traditional rationale for challenging horizontal 
mergers—namely, that increased market concentration in labor markets will threaten 
to facilitate coordinated interaction28 among employers that could lead to lower 
                                                                                                                
23. California v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-05874, 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014). 
The decision is discussed in more detail infra text accompanying notes 122–24. 
24. eBay, 2014 WL 4273888. 
25. On the identity of the employees subject to the nonpoaching agreement, see Third 
Amended Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Act, Cartwright Act, and Unfair 
Competition Law for Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties at *9, California v. eBay, Inc., No. 
12-CV-05874-PSG, 2014 WL 9912567 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014). 
26. See Peter Z. Grossman, Why One Cartel Fails and Another Endures: The Joint 
Executive Committee and the Railroad Express, in HOW CARTELS ENDURE AND HOW THEY 
FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION 111, 117–29 (Peter Z. Grossman ed., 2004); 
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking up is Hard to Do: Determinants of 
Cartel Duration, 54 J. L. & ECON. 455 (2011); Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 
What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 43 (2006). 
27. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8, at 48; infra text accompanying notes 92–93.
28. The term “coordinated interaction” is commonly used in merger policy to speak of 
mergers that threaten either express price fixing or else some kind of oligopoly or other follow-
the-leader pricing. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 7 at 24 (“A 
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output, as well as wage suppression, in employment markets. Because most mergers 
are challenged prior to their occurrence, the threat is not of observed coordinated 
interaction, but rather of an “appreciable danger” that it may occur if the merger is 
permitted to proceed.29
We also outline the major issues that enforcement agencies, both federal and state, 
are likely to encounter in assessing mergers threatening competitive harm in labor 
markets. Much of this analysis would also apply to private plaintiff challenges. While 
employees generally lack standing to use the antitrust laws to challenge antitrust 
violations in product markets, they clearly have standing when the harm occurs in 
the labor market in which they are employed.30 An employee who can provide 
satisfactory proof that he or she was injured by lower wages that resulted from a 
merger of the employer would have standing to obtain either damages or an 
injunction.31
Recent economic literature has shown that labor market concentration is a 
widespread phenomenon, with the majority of U.S. labor markets exhibiting high 
concentration.32 Increasing labor market concentration has likely contributed to one 
widely observed phenomenon—namely, that the share of labor in American Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) has fallen substantially.33 Indeed, the markets in which 
firms purchase labor are often significantly more concentrated than the markets in 
which they sell their products.34
Just to be clear here, the term labor market concentration refers to the 
concentration that exists among the firms who hire and employ labor, not to the 
                                                                                                                
merger may diminish competition by enabling or encouraging post-merger coordinated 
interaction among firms in the relevant market.”). As such, the term can speak about a variety 
of behaviors. See United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 77 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(“As the Merger Guidelines explain, coordinated interaction involves a range of conduct, 
including unspoken understandings about how firms will compete or refrain from 
competing.”). 
29. See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, 
J.) (“Section 7 does not require proof that a merger or other acquisition has caused higher 
prices in the affected market. All that is necessary is that the merger create an appreciable 
danger of [collusive practices] in the future.”); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 114–
15 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 116 (D.D.C. 2004))
(“Proof of actual anticompetitive effects is not required; instead, the FTC must show an 
appreciable danger future coordinated interaction based on predictive judgment.”). 
30. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 352 (4th ed. 
2014) (discussing employee antitrust standing to sue for violations that occur in labor 
markets). 
31. Id.
32. José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi Taska, Concentration in 
US Labor Markets: Evidence From Online Vacancy Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 24395, 2018), [hereinafter Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data]
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24395 [https://perma.cc/W2YY-C5NQ].
33. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6. 
34. José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration 7–
8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), [hereinafter Azar et al., 
Labor Market Concentration] http://www.nber.org/papers/w24147 [https://perma.cc/RV7X-
2ZYL]. 
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concentration among the laborers themselves. For example, if an area has two coal 
mines that employ coal miners, we would speak of that labor market as highly 
concentrated, even though there might be 1000 miners who are employed or seeking 
employment in those two mines. That would be an example of a highly concentrated 
labor market on the employer side, even though the market of the employees 
themselves is diffuse. In that case, very likely all the bargaining power would be on 
the side of the mines. Many product markets have similar characteristics. For 
example, while the automobile production market has relatively few sellers its 
customers number in the millions. 
We measure the correlation between wages and labor market concentration by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),35 just as we do for product markets. That 
correlation is at least as strong as is the correlation between product prices and 
HHIs.36 As a result, the approach taken to concentration levels in the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines, linking the level of scrutiny to the concentration level, should work 
equally well in labor markets. 
Mergers can also be condemned under a “unilateral effects” theory in 
differentiated product markets. The theory is that a merger between firms who are 
reasonably adjacent in product space in a differentiated market might permit the two 
firms to increase their own price without coordinating prices with the remaining 
firms in the market.37 In such cases, the price of the output of the post-merger firm 
increases, while that of more remote rivals in the same market does not. Because 
labor markets are also differentiated there is no reason in principle that the same 
theory could not apply to mergers suppressing labor market competition. But that 
problem has not been fully theorized in any literature of which we are aware and we 
reserve it for another time.38 This paper is concerned with labor market mergers that 
present an appreciable risk of collusion or collusion-like behavior by the employers 
in a labor market. 
II. MERGER POLICY AND MONOPSONY
When few firms dominate selling in a product market, we call it an oligopoly, or 
supply-side lack of competition.39 When few firms dominate buying in a market, we 
call it an oligopsony, or demand-side lack of competition.40 In an extreme case, when 
just one buyer dominates the market, we have a monopsony, a termed coined by 
economist Joan Robinson in The Economics of Imperfect Competition in 1933.41 The 
                                                                                                                
35. On the HHI and its use, see infra text accompanying notes 46–50. 
36. On the latter correlation, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal 
Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
37. See id.
38. For an outline of some of the theory, see Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, 
Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018). 
39. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 404. 
40. See C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 
2078 (2018).  
41. JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933); see also Robert 
J. Thornton, How Joan Robinson and B.L. Hallward Named Monopsony, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 
257 (2004). 
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classic case of a labor market monopsony is the company town, where a single 
company, such as a mine, dominates employment. This monopsony situation is 
especially likely to arise in specialized jobs, e.g. miners, for which there is literally 
only one company hiring in town. The term “monopsony” is used today in labor 
economics to refer to both a monopsony proper and to an oligopsony, where the 
number of purchasers of labor is small, but greater than one.42 In the remainder of 
this paper, the term “monopsony” refers to situations where a few companies 
dominate hiring in the labor market. 
Just as a monopoly depresses production, a labor monopsony depresses 
employment below the level that would obtain in a perfectly competitive market.43
By employing fewer workers, the monopsonist makes a higher profit because it can 
pay workers less than their productivity, capturing the surplus for itself. In a perfectly 
competitive labor market each worker would receive the marginal value of his or her 
labor.44 But the firm with market power in the market where it purchases labor will 
suppress its purchases, driving the wage down. Compared to a perfectly competitive 
labor market, monopsony leads to lower employment and lower wages. Ceteris 
paribus, lower employment also entails lower production on the output (product) 
side. Ultimately, imperfect competition in the labor market has the same kind of 
depressing effect on production as imperfect competition in the product market. 
Until recently, imperfect competition in the labor market has not received much 
attention in antitrust enforcement. One possible reason is the belief that there are 
many jobs out there, so a merger is unlikely to lead to a monopsony and to 
substantially affect workers’ opportunities in the labor market. Another possibility is 
that people assume that workers are highly mobile and can readily relocate from 
places with fewer to those with greater opportunities. However, a growing body of 
empirical evidence indicates that labor market monopsony is a real issue. A number 
of studies have focused on specific U.S. labor markets.45 A 2018 paper by Azar, 
Marinescu, Steinbaum, and Taska shows that monopsony is likely to be an issue in 
the majority of U.S. labor markets.46 That paper defines a labor market as a six-digit 
                                                                                                                
42. See William M. Boal and Michael R Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J.
ECON. LIT. 86 (1997). 
43. Just as the monopolist seeks to maximize profits by equating marginal cost and 
marginal revenue, the monopsonist tries to equate marginal outlay with marginal revenue. See
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 1.2b & n.25 (5th ed. 2015). 
44. By contrast, if the workers had market power, they would receive more than the 
marginal value of their labor. For example, if a town had four hospitals requiring 
anesthesiologists but only two local anesthesiologists, the hospitals would bid up their salaries 
to supacompetitive levels, assuming that the local area was a geographic market; that is, that 
bringing in anesthesiologists from outside at current prices was not feasible. 
45. Jordan D. Matsudaira, Monopsony in the Low-Wage Labor Market? Evidence from 
Minimum Nurse Staffing Regulations, 96 REV. ECON. STAT. 92 (2013); Michael R. Ransom & 
David P. Sims, Estimating the Firm’s Labor Supply Curve in a ‘New Monopsony’ Framework: 
Schoolteachers in Missouri, 28 J. LABOR ECON. 331 (2010); Douglas O. Staiger, Joanne Spetz, 
& Ciaran S. Phibbs, Is There Monopsony in the Labor Market? Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment, 28 J. LABOR ECON. 211 (2010). 
46. Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data, supra note 32. 
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SOC (“Standard Occupational Classification”)47 by commuting zone (e.g. 
accountants and auditors in the Philadelphia commuting zone).48 Data on job 
postings from the essentially all vacancies posted online in 2016 show that the HHI
is above 2500 in 54% of U.S. labor markets. Another 11% of markets are moderately 
concentrated, i.e. have an HHI between 1500 and 2500. Furthermore, Azar, 
Marinescu and Steinbaum49 show that an increase in HHI is associated with lower 
wages advertised by companies in their job postings.50 By definition, a horizontal 
merger increases concentration because it reduces by one (in the case of a two-firm 
merger) the number of firms in the market. 
The HHI is equal to the sum of the squares of the market shares of each firm in 
the market.51 That index has become conventional in industry concentration 
measures and has been used in the government’s Merger Guidelines for some thirty-
five years.52 Under the 2010 Merger Guidelines in use today, if a market had five 
equal size firms each would have a 20% market share and the market’s HHI would 
be 202 + 202 +202 +202 +202, or 2000. If two of these firms should merge there would 
now be one firm with a 40% market and three with 20% shares. The HHI would read 
402 +202 +202 +202, or 2800. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines define markets 
with post-merger HHIs exceeding 2500 as “highly concentrated,” and state that 
mergers in such markets that also increase the HHI level by more than 100 points 
“raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.”53 Further 
mergers in such markets that increase the HHI by more than 200 points “will be 
presumed to be likely to enhance market power” unless rebutted by persuasive 
evidence.54 This hypothetical merger would fall within that category. 
Below, we present the economic theory and evidence for monopsony in the U.S. 
labor market. We discuss market definition for the labor market and argue that HHIs 
based on U.S. vacancy data55 can be used to make a prima facie case against a 
horizontal merger based on the existing Horizontal Merger Guidelines. We then 
discuss several related issues, including the relevance of widespread use of 
noncompete agreements56 and how the efficiency defense may be mobilized by 
companies to combat the government’s prima facie case against a merger.57
                                                                                                                
47. See infra text accompanying notes 85–87.
48. On the relevance of a commuting zone, see infra text accompanying notes 83–85. 
49. Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration, supra note 34. 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 90–92.
51. On use of the HHI in merger assessment, see 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 930–32 (4th ed. 2014); HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, § 12.4. 
52. The first version of the Merger Guidelines to employ the HHI was issued in 1982. All 
versions are maintained by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies in an archival website. 
See 1982 Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov 
/archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/BM7S-94KN].  
53. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 5.3. 
54. Id.
55. These data can be obtained from aggregators. See, e.g., BURNINGGLASS 
TECHNOLOGIES, http://burning-glass.com [https://perma.cc/K9FF-75BP]; EMSI, http://www 
.economicmodeling.com [https://perma.cc/5V6Q-QYA6]; INDEED, https://www.indeed.com 
[https://perma.cc/AAS5-2X6P].  
56. See infra Part VI. 
57. See infra Part VII. 
1040 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:1031 
To have a chance of succeeding, an efficiency case for a merger affecting a labor 
market must show that post-merger reorganization will decrease the need for workers 
and will not lower total production. Both of these requirements are essential. A 
merger that decreases the need for workers may represent nothing more than an 
exercise of monopsony power, but in that case, ceteris paribus, it will also reduce 
production. By contrast, a merger that eliminates duplication can also reduce the need 
for workers, but production will not go down. Indeed, it should go up to the extent 
that the post-merger firm has lower costs. For example, a merger of two automobile 
manufacturers, such as Daimler (Mercedes-Benz) and Chrysler might result in a 
consolidation of dealerships. To the extent these dealerships can sell both brands in 
one facility, thus reducing distribution costs, the merger might qualify for the 
efficiency defense even if employment in dealerships is reduced.58 But in that case 
we would expect that the firm’s product output would, if anything, increase as its 
distribution costs went down. 
III. LACK OF COMPETITION IN THE LABOR MARKET: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
To understand the impact of a lack of competition in the labor market, consider 
the only hair salon in a small town.59 As the only purchaser of the labor of hair 
dressers, it is likely to have monopsony power in that market. To simplify further, 
assume that the labor of hairdressers is the only input that the salon needs in order to 
function. Suppose the hair salon owner works with one hairdresser, who is paid $8 
per hour. This one hairdresser generates a revenue of $11 per hour and there are no 
other costs. As a result, the owner makes a profit of $3 per hour ($11 revenue minus 
$8 wages) on this first hire. To attract a second hairdresser, the owner would have to 
pay $10 per hour, because this second hairdresser would rather not work than earn 
just $8 per hour, or perhaps because she lives further away from the hair salon than 
the first hairdresser. This is consistent with the general economic observation that 
supply curves slope upward, including those in the labor market. That is, a firm starts 
out with the lowest cost sources of supply and each incremental unit of supply comes 
in at a higher cost.60
A second hairdresser would generate an additional revenue of $11 per hour as 
well. This hairdresser still brings in $1 ($11 revenue minus $10 wages) of net profit 
and should be hired if nothing else changes. A profit-maximizing employer would 
continue to hire additional hairdressers as long as the incremental revenue each one 
produces exceeds his or her wage.  
                                                                                                                
58. The situation is hypothetical. Although the Daimler-Chrysler merger did occur, it was 
not challenged. On the merger, see Company History, DAIMLER, https://www.daimler.com 
/company/tradition/company-history/1995-2007.html [https://perma.cc/5V79-E9BZ].  
59. On the simple economics, see V. Bhaskar, Alan Manning & Ted To, Oligopsony and 
Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (2002); William M. 
Boal & Michael R Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 86 (1997); 
Richard Dickens, Stephen Machin & Alan Manning, The Effects of Minimum Wages on 
Employment: Theory and Evidence from Britain, 17 J. LABOR ECON. 1 (1999). 
60. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 135 (12th ed. 2015).  
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However, workers who work in the same role typically have to be paid the same 
amount.61 So, if the salon owner hired this second hairdresser, he or she would also 
have to pay the first hairdresser $10 per hour instead of $8, and would make only $1 
of profit per hour from the first hairdresser instead of $3. If the salon owner hires the 
two hairdressers for $10 per hour each, the owner makes $1 profit on each, for a 
grand total of $2. Two dollars an hour of profit is less than the $3 an hour of profit 
that the owner can make when he or she works with just the first hairdresser. 
Therefore, the most profitable strategy in this case is for the owner to hire just one 
hairdresser, pay a low wage of $8 instead of $10, and produce only $11 of revenue 
per hour instead of $22, or a 50% cut in production. 
This example illustrates the depressing effect of monopsony on wages and 
production. The nondiscriminating monopsonist declines to hire incremental workers 
even though each of those workers considered individually brings in more revenue 
than that worker’s wage. This outcome also produces a “deadweight” loss identical 
to the loss produced when a monopolist reduces output in a product market. In this 
case the resources that would have been provided by the second hair dresser go 
unused, even though they were worth more than they cost.62
There are several important conclusions to draw from this illustration. First, the 
whole story cannot even take off if workers are paid according to the revenue that 
they are adding, i.e.—in economics jargon—if wages are equal to marginal 
productivity. In this case, the first hairdresser would be paid $11 already, so there is 
nothing to gain by not adding the second hairdresser.  
Second, the existence of monopsony power has important implications for the 
levels of wages and production. In a competitive labor market, each recruiting firm 
is small (a drop in the proverbial bucket) and it can hire as many workers as it wants 
at the market wage. In a monopsonistic labor market, the hiring firm has market 
power and hiring more workers necessitates an increase in wages. Therefore, if the 
labor market is perfectly competitive, wages are equal to marginal productivity and 
there is no incentive for companies to hire fewer workers to make higher profits by 
depressing wages. If the labor market is not perfectly competitive and companies are 
in a position to be able to pay workers below their marginal productivity, then wages 
and production are both lower than under the competitive equilibrium. 
Third, this example shows that having to increase wages in order to attract more 
workers is a sign of monopsony power. In a competitive market, a firm can already 
have all the workers it wants by paying the market wages. So, a firm that unilaterally 
increases its wage by even a little bit can attract all of the workers in the market: in 
economics jargon, we say that the elasticity of labor supply (the percent increase in 
employment in reaction to a 1% increase in wages) to the individual firm is infinite 
when the market is perfectly competitive. In a monopsonistic labor market, the hiring 
firm has market power and hiring more workers necessitates an increase in wages. 
In this case, the elasticity of labor supply to the individual firm is not infinite, but 
                                                                                                                
61. That is, the theory of monopoly generally assumes that the monopolist is not able to 
engage in price discrimination. The availability of price discrimination can result in greater or 
smaller output, depending on the circumstances, and also has ambiguous welfare effects. See, 
e.g., MICHAEL E. WETZSTEIN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: CONCEPTS AND CONNECTIONS 551 
(2d ed. 2013). On antitrust implications, see 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 721. 
62. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 45. 
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finite: only a few more workers will come to the firm for any small increase in wages. 
Therefore, empirically speaking, a small elasticity of labor supply to the individual 
firm (i.e. the fact that an increase in wages only attracts a limited number of workers, 
or equivalently the fact that a decrease in wages only drives away a limited number 
of workers) is a sign of labor market monopsony. 
The key message from economic theory is that as one moves away from the 
competitive equilibrium towards a situation of monopsony in the labor market, wages 
and production both generally tend to decrease. This also explains why labor cartels 
such as the eBay/Intuit anti-poaching agreement are anticompetitive.63 If the 
marginal value of a software engineer to each firm is $50 per hour, then each would 
hire as long as the next engineer produced more revenue than labor cost. But the no-
poach agreement enables the two firms together to behave in the same way that a 
single firm monopsonist would behave in our hairdresser example above.64 In that 
case the firms maximize their own profits by restricting output and paying less than 
the marginal contribution of each employee. 
Empirical labor economics has studied the topic of monopsony for some time. 
The key findings from this literature are convincing that monopsony power exists, 
and that workers are paid below their marginal productivity.65 This literature has 
examined a number of different occupations and industries in the US. The elasticity 
of labor supply to the individual firm (percent increase in employment in reaction to 
a 1% change in wages) is estimated to be between 0.1 and 4, with most estimates 
being below 2.66 In a competitive labor market, this elasticity should tend towards 
infinity.67 The fact that these numbers are small indicates that the labor market is not 
perfectly competitive and monopsony power exists. The inverse of the elasticity also 
gives us an estimate of the level of worker productivity relative to wages. An 
elasticity of two implies that worker productivity is 50% (1/2) higher than wages. 
Hence, workers are paid significantly less than their marginal productivity.  
For the purpose of a merger review in labor markets, the most important question 
is whether a merger is likely to increase the amount of monopsony in a labor market, 
thus reducing wages and output. In the case of a merger to a monopsony with a 100% 
market share that answer is clear, based on little more than the theory of monopsony 
presented above. For example, if eBay and Intuit are the only two firms bidding for 
a particular group of software engineers, a merger between them would create a 
monopsony in that market. 
                                                                                                                
63. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
64. This is simply the flip side of the observation that a well-functioning cartel has the 
same price and output that a monopolist in the same market would have. See HOVENKAMP,
supra note 43, § 4.1. 
65. See ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR 
MARKETS (2003); Alan Manning, Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market 973, in 4
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card, eds., 2011), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169721811024099 [https://perma.cc 
/Q3JW-GS7Z]; Orley C. Ashenfelter, Henry Farber & Michael R Ransom, Labor Market 
Monopsony, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 203 (2010); William M. Boal & Michael R Ransom, Monopsony 
in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 86 (1997). 
66. Manning, supra note 65. 
67. See id.
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But what if the hiring market contains more than two firms, and the merger simply 
lessens the number of firms who are hiring; that is, it increases labor market 
concentration in that market as measured by the HHI?68 Here the theory of labor 
market monopsony takes its cue from the vast literature linking market concentration 
in selling markets to noncompetitive performance.69
The sources of the relationship between concentration and price/output are 
manifold and complex, and there is no point in rehearsing the entire literature here.70
Nevertheless, a few observations are important. First, because most mergers are 
reviewed prior to their occurrence71 we do not test actual relationships between 
merger-induced increases in concentration and product (or labor) prices in each 
specific market individually. Rather, we employ concentration data plus some 
evidence of other market factors to make predictions. 
Ceteris paribus, as labor market concentration levels rise, predicted wages 
decline. This can be true for several reasons. Most simply, a market with fewer firms 
is more susceptible to express collusion, or agreements setting wages or dividing 
markets. Further, the history of enforcement in that area shows that many firms are 
prone to fix wages when they can.72 In addition, the firms may engage in one of 
several types of oligopsony behavior which, while falling short of express collusion, 
nevertheless serves to coordinate their wages and output.73 Indeed, many of these 
agreements are unreachable under the antitrust laws because the price fixing statute, 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, requires an express agreement.74 As a result it is all the 
more important that merger law be applied in these cases because, once the merger 
has occurred, the law of collusion will not be able to reach them.75 Prima facie there 
is no reason to doubt that the same concentration factors that facilitate oligopoly 
behavior in product (selling) markets work in labor (purchasing) market as well. 
Indeed, follow-the-leader wage setting and inter-employer exchanges of wage and 
                                                                                                                
68. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
69. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance,
in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951, 988 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig eds., 1989) (finding strong correlations between concentration and price levels); 
William N. Evans, Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, Endogeneity in the Concentration-
Price Relationship: Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 41 J. INDUS. ECON. 431 (1993) (same; 
airline industry). 
70. See Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 36. Recent literature is summarized in 
JONATHAN B. BAKER, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, MARKET POWER IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY TODAY (2017), https://equitablegrowth.org/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy 
-today [https://perma.cc/AD42-7S2F].
71. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, mergers of the requisite minimum size are reported 
in advance and the government has an opportunity to challenge them before the transaction is 
completed. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012). 
72. See infra note 120. 
73. The literature on implicit oligopoly coordination is also substantial. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND 
COMPETITORS 93–95, 106 (1980). 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (prohibiting “contracts,” “combinations,” and “conspiracies”).
75. See Hovenkamp, supra note 8. 
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salary information76 appear to be common in employment markets just as similar 
types of behaviors are observed in product markets.77
In sum, well accepted methodologies justify making a prima facie case against a 
merger based on the overall level of concentration in the affected labor market, as 
well as the extent to which the merger increases concentration.78 Labor market 
concentration can be defined by analogy with product market concentration. One can 
use the share of each company among job vacancies in a labor market in order to 
calculate labor market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
The HHI for the labor market using vacancy shares can be calculated using a 
database of U.S. vacancies acquired from vendors such as Emsi,79 BurningGlass,80
or Indeed.81 One important question is what the definition of the labor market should 
be: we offer a plausible but preliminary discussion of the appropriate definition here.  
Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum, and Taska82 calculate labor market concentration 
using 2016 job postings data from Burning Glass Technologies, a company that 
collects all jobs posted online in the United States. The authors define a labor market 
as an occupation by commuting zone by quarter: this would be, for example, 
accountants and auditors in the Philadelphia commuting zone in the first quarter of 
2016.83 They thus calculate vacancy shares and HHIs of market concentration for all 
labor markets, defined by a combination of occupation at the SOC-6 level84 and 
commuting zone. An SOC-6 level occupation is a reference to a list of “Standard 
Occupational Classifications” maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.85 The “6 
level” reference is to the level of detail.86 Occupations are assigned a six-digit code, 
and the sixth digit is the highest level of classification. 
                                                                                                                
76. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (condemning exchange of salary 
information of geologists among petroleum refiners where the intent was to suppress wages). 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (condemning 
exchange of product price information). 
78. Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 36. 
79. EMSI, http://www.economicmodeling.com [https://perma.cc/5V6Q-QYA6]. 
80. BURNING GLASS TECHNOLOGIES, http://burning-glass.com [https://perma.cc/B8Z3 
-T3SG].
81. INDEED, https://www.indeed.com [http://perma.cc/AAS5-2X6P].
82. Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data, supra note 32. 
83. Id.
84. On the meaning of this classification, see infra text accompanying notes 120–21. 
85. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL 
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS (2017), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/2A8V-WQGQ].
86. For example, “Life, Physical and Social Science Occupations” (19-0000) is divided 
into four minor groups: “Life Scientists” (19-1000), “Physical Scientists” (19-2000), “Social 
Scientists and Related Workers” (19-3000), and “Life, Physical and Social Science 
Technicians” (19-4000). Life Scientists contains broad occupations such as “Agriculture and 
Food Scientists” (19-1010) and “Biological Scientists” (19-1020). The broad occupation 
Biological Scientists includes detailed occupations such as “Biochemists and Biophysicists”
(19-1021) and “Microbiologists” (19-1022). See id.
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Where the variable J is the total number of firms posting in market m and quarter 
t. ݏ௝ǡ௠ǡ௧ is the share of a firm in the market defined as the sum of vacancies posted 
online by firm j in market m and quarter t divided by total vacancies posted on online 
in market m and quarter t by all firms J. To use the numerical example for the HHI 
developed above, imagine a labor market with five firms each posting ten jobs in the 
market. Then, each firm has a 20% market share and the market’s HHI is 202 + 202
+202 +202 +202, or 2000. If two of these firms should merge there would now be one 
firm with a 40% market share and the HHI would read 402 +202 +202 +202, or 2800.  
On average, labor markets are highly concentrated: the average HHI is 3953,
which is well above the 2500 threshold for high concentration according to the 
Merger Guidelines.87 Concentration varies by occupation and city, with larger cities 
being less concentrated. This is consistent with the intuition that a larger urban area 
will have more employers of a particular type within a commuting zone. For 
example, while the small town may have only one hair salon, a large city almost 
certainly has several, who compete with one another for qualified hair dressers. 
Assuming that the hair dressers have sufficient mobility within that area,88 the result 
will be higher wages or salaries. Figure 1 shows these concentration levels across the 
country.89
                                                                                                                
87. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 5.3. 
88. On the relevance of noncompetition covenants see infra Part VI. 
89. The figure is taken from Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data, supra note 32, at 24 fig.1. 
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Figure 1 
Having shown that the majority of labor markets are highly concentrated, the next 
natural question is whether higher concentration reduces wages. Azar, Marinescu 
and Steinbaum study the impact of labor market concentration on wages using 2010-
2013 job postings data from the largest online job board in the United States, 
CareerBuilder.com.90 The occupations covered in Azar, Marinescu and Steinbaum 
include the most frequent occupations among CareerBuilder vacancies, plus the top 
occupations in manufacturing and construction.91
The authors show that average posted wages are strongly negatively correlated 
with labor market concentration as measured by HHI.92 However, this correlation 
alone cannot be counted as strong evidence that higher concentration depresses 
wages in a causal sense. Indeed, economic conditions can differ considerably across 
labor markets: for example, in more depressed labor markets, there are fewer job 
postings, which mechanically leads to higher concentration. Since wages in 
                                                                                                                
90. Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration, supra note 34. Monster.com is similar in 
size.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 26 fig.2; accord COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, supra note 6; Efraim 
Benmelech, Nittai Bergman & Hyunseob Kim, Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How 
Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 24307, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24307 [https://perma.cc/4J4F-SDM5]. 
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depressed labor markets also tend to be lower, this could drive the negative 
correlation between concentration and wages. 
As a result, it is necessary to look at the data in other ways in order to show that 
concentration likely does lead to lower wages in a causal sense. In particular, instead 
of comparing different labor markets, one can look at how changes in concentration 
within a given market over time affects wages. The data indicate that when labor 
market concentration increases, posted wages decrease.93 Furthermore, to account 
for economic conditions in each specific market, one must control for the number of 
job postings divided by the number of job applications, also called “labor market 
tightness” in economic jargon.94 When tightness is high, the market is more favorable 
to workers in that there are many job postings compared to the number of 
applications, and wages are therefore higher. Tightness is a very good control for the 
market situation because it accounts for both changes in labor demand (changes in 
job postings) and changes in labor supply (changes in the number of job 
applications). Even after controlling for tightness, the impact of labor market 
concentration on wages remains negative and statistically significant.95 This, 
together with additional empirical analysis performed in the paper, shows that the 
negative effect of concentration on wages is likely to be causal and not just driven 
by unaccounted for market conditions. 
How large is the impact of labor market concentration on posted wages? 
Depending on the specific statistical model used, a 10% increase in concentration 
leads to a 0.3% to 1.3% decrease in wages.96 Furthermore, the impact of 
concentration on wages is larger in smaller cities.97 Therefore, smaller cities are 
doubly disadvantaged by having higher levels of labor market concentration and by 
suffering more from an increase in concentration. 
In sum, the evidence shows that it is straightforward to calculate labor market 
concentration with vacancy data. Labor market concentration can be very high, 
especially in smaller cities where it is routinely above the 2500 HHI threshold for 
high concentration according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Furthermore, 
higher concentration is robustly associated with lower wages. 98
                                                                                                                
93. Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration, supra note 34, at 24 tbl.2. 
94. Id. at 12. 
95. Id. at 24 tbl.2. 
96. Id.
97. Id. at 27 fig.3. 
98. For a discussion showing a negative association between wages and concentration,
see Brad Hershbein, Claudia Macaluso & Chen Yeh, Concentration in U.S. Local Labor 
Markets: Evidence from Vacancy and Employment Data (W.E. Upjohn Inst., Working Paper, 
2019); Elena Prager & Matt Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from 
Hospitals (Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth, Working Paper, 2019); Kevin Rinz, Labor 
Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earnings Mobility, (Ctr. for Admin. Records 
Research & Applications, Working Paper No. 2018-10, 2018); Yue Qiu & Aaron Sojourner, 
Labor-Market Concentration and Labor Compensation (IZA Inst. of Labor Econ., Working 
Paper No. 12089, 2019). 
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IV. ASSESSING THE RELEVANT MARKET FOR LABOR MARKET 
MERGERS: SSNIP AND SSNRW 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act requires a court to identify some “line of commerce” 
and some “section of the country” in which a merger threatens to injure 
competition.99 Ever since the Supreme Court’s Brown Shoe decision it has become 
conventional to identify these two statutory requirements, respectively, as a relevant 
product market and a relevant geographic market,100 subject to the ordinary antitrust 
tools of market definition.101 Labor markets are no exception. The boundaries of 
labor markets are driven mainly by employee skills or training. Geographic markets 
are driven mainly by the location and mobility of current or prospective employees. 
On the latter point, applications for a job decline rapidly with distance, although 
most applications are still for employers located outside the applicant's zip code.102
We suggest a provisional definition of a labor market as a commuting zone by six-
digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) by quarter.103 We now justify the 
choice for each of these three elements: the geography, occupation, and time. 
Traditional geographic markets for products are frequently defined in terms of 
shipping costs: the higher the cost in relation to value, the smaller the market.104
Under that definition, markets for many manufactured products are nationwide or 
even worldwide, although markets for perishable items or those with high shipping 
costs in relation to value can be much smaller. Service markets are often smaller as 
well. Measuring geographic markets for labor is more complex. Commuting “costs” 
include not merely the price of a subway ticket or gasoline, but also time and 
convenience, and these things frequently vary from one commuter to another. 
Observed Commuting Zones (CZs) can be used to define geographic labor 
markets.105 Commuting zones are geographic area definitions comprising clusters of 
counties that were developed by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA).106 They are based on data from the 2000 Census on commuting patterns 
across counties to capture local economies and local labor markets in a way that is 
more economically meaningful than county boundaries.107 According to the USDA, 
“commuting zones were developed without regard to a minimum population 
                                                                                                                
99. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
100. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324–25 (1962) (“The ‘area of 
effective competition’ must be determined by reference to a product market (the ‘line of 
commerce’) and a geographic market (the ‘section of the country’).”).
101. On market definition under the antitrust laws, see 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 21, chs. 5C–5F. 
102. Ioana Marinescu & Roland Rathelot, Mismatch Unemployment and the Geography of 
Job Search, 10 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 42 (2018). 
103. This follows the methodology in Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data, supra note 32. 
104. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 552. 
105. See Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data, supra note 32. 
106. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Commuting Zones and Labor Market Areas (last updated 
Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/commuting-zones-and-labor-market 
-areas/ [https://perma.cc/7AQJ-CZJV]. 
107. Id.  
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threshold and are intended to be a spatial measure of the local labor market.”108 More 
than 80% of job applications occur where the job applicant and prospective employer 
are within the same commuting zone.109
Six-digit SOC codes can assist us in defining markets by occupational category.
To determine whether this definition is sensible for the analysis of a monopsonistic 
labor market, it is important to examine how posted wages affect the number of 
applicants that a job posting receives. This relationship between wages and the 
number of applicants is a version of the elasticity of labor supply discussed above. A 
small elasticity of labor supply, i.e. a wage increase that has a small effect on the 
number of applicants, signals a less competitive labor market.110 However, whether 
the market is competitive or not, we expect that higher wages attract as many or more 
applicants than lower wages. 
Surprisingly, within a six-digit SOC occupation, job postings with higher wages 
attract significantly fewer applicants than jobs with lower wages.111 This negative 
relationship between wages and the number of applicants prevails on average across 
all six-digit SOC codes and is driven by the fact that workers within a six-digit SOC 
code can be very different from each other. For example, among accountants and 
auditors, which is a six-digit SOC code, job postings with the title “senior 
accountant” pay higher wages and attract fewer applicants than job postings with the 
title “junior accountant.”112 This shows that generally, a six-digit SOC is likely too 
broad a definition of the labor market. One can also define a labor market by a job 
title and examine the relationship between wages and applicants for all job titles.113
Within a job title, the relationship between wages and the number of applicants is no 
longer negative but becomes positive: a 10% increase in the posted wage is 
associated with a 7.7% increase in the number of applicants (an elasticity of 0.77).114
Therefore, the elasticity of labor supply is far from being infinite as it would be in a 
perfectly competitive labor market.  
Based on the elasticities of labor supply within a six-digit SOC occupation and 
within a job title, we can use the equivalent of a “small significant non-transitory 
increase in price” (SSNIP) test for the labor market to determine which labor market 
is relevant for antitrust analysis. Since 1982, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have 
included the hypothetical monopolist test to determine whether a product market 
could be profitably monopolized.115 The idea of the hypothetical monopolist test is 
                                                                                                                
108. Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data, supra note 32.
109. See Marinescu & Rathelot, supra note 102. Compare the Elzinga-Hogarty test for 
geographic markets, which looks at the extent to which goods are shipped across a line 
provisionally defined as the boundary of the geographic market. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & 
Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 
ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973); see also 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 550a3. 
110. Boal & Ransom, supra note 42. 
111. Ioana Marinescu & Ronald Wolthoff, Opening the Black Box of the Matching 
Function: The Power of Words (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22508, 




115. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Economics and the 1992 Merger 
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to use as the relevant antitrust market the smallest market for which a hypothetical 
monopolist (or cartel) that controlled that market would find it profitable to 
implement a SSNIP.116
In practice, the methodology hypothesizes a specified price increase, typically 5% 
and for a period of at least a year, and considers whether the monopolist or cartel that 
increases the price would lose so many sales that the price increase would be 
unprofitable.117 This is a function mainly of the number of lost sales (elasticity) and 
price-cost margins.118 The more elastic the demand, the more sales will be lost in 
response to the price increase. The higher the margin, the more costly those losses 
will be. 
The analogous question for considering monopsony in the labor market would be 
to identify the smallest labor market for which a hypothetical monopsonist in that 
market would find profitable to implement a “small and significant but non-transitory 
reduction in wages” (SSNRW). The more elastic the labor supply, the more workers 
will be lost to a decrease in wages. The formula for the critical elasticity of labor 
supply to the individual firm is the direct equivalent of the formula for the critical 
elasticity of demand. If the elasticity of labor supply is below the critical elasticity, 
then the market is an appropriately defined relevant market for the purpose of 
antitrust merger analysis. If the elasticity of labor supply is greater than the critical 
elasticity, then the market is defined too narrowly. Since the critical elasticity is 
always positive and the elasticity of labor supply is estimated to be negative within 
a six-digit SOC, a six-digit SOC is typically too broad a market definition under this 
methodology.119 A job title would be a more reasonable market definition according 
to this test. 
SOC codes may also affect assessments of the degree of competition in a market 
in other ways. To illustrate, at the sixth level, the occupation of “cooks” is divided 
into “fast food,” “institutions and cafeteria,” “private household,” “restaurant,” 
“short order,” and “all other” cooks.120 While this classification might be useful for 
                                                                                                                
Guidelines: A Brief Survey, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG. 139 (1993); Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 
Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 71 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 253 (2003). 
116. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, § 3.2; David Scheffman, Malcolm Coate & Louis 
Silvia, Twenty Years of Merger Guidelines Enforcement at the FTC: An Economic 
Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 277 (2003). 
117. The methodology is referred to as “critical loss analysis.” Barry C. Harris & Joseph 
J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?, 12 RES. L. &
ECON. 207 (1989); see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2008, at 1. 
118. See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox 
in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010). 
119. For further discussion and a mathematical treatment of the “small and significant but 
non-transitory reduction in wages,” see Azar et al., Online Vacancy Data, supra note 32. 
120. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 85, which adopts the following 
classification scheme: 
• 35-0000 Food Preparation and Serving Related Occupations 
• 35-2000 Cooks and Food Preparation Workers
• 35-2010 Cooks 
• 35-2011 Cooks, Fast Food 
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labor purposes it is hardly clear that employees in these individual sixth-level 
classifications do not compete with one another on the job market. For example, a 
“short order” cook might compete for a job notice requesting a “restaurant” or “fast 
food” cook, or vice-versa. As a result, there may be more competition for a particular 
job than the SOC classifications suggest. As is true in so many areas involving 
government classifications, including census of manufacturing data, the correlation 
between government classification data and relevant antitrust market can be poor.121
One reason that this is true is that antitrust market definition proceeds not by looking 
merely who is currently in a market, but rather who would be in the market in 
response to a wage increase or decrease.122
In sum, 6-digit SOC codes may be too broad, depending on the circumstances, 
and job titles may be a better definition of a labor market. However, it may be prudent 
to adopt the more conservative definition of a labor market. Therefore, we conclude 
that a 6-digit SOC occupation is a reasonable and perhaps conservative presumptive
definition of a labor market, in the sense that it may under-estimate effective labor 
market concentration. In any event, the SSNRW equivalent of the SSNIP test would 
have to be estimated individually for each proposed merger under consideration 
because of possible anticompetitive impact on wages, much as the SSNIP test is used 
in product markets today. 
Once the market is defined, concentration must be computed. For this, one must 
choose a time period: this is particularly important for the labor market because job 
seekers can only afford to be unemployed and looking for a job for a limited period 
of time. The median duration of unemployment is about 10 weeks.123 That is, 
unemployed job seekers typically are hired or drop out of the market within about 
one quarter. This is why it is presumptively sensible to calculate labor market 
concentration over a quarter. 
Having computed the HHI for the labor market based on vacancy shares in the 
commuting zone, six-digit SOC and quarter, one can use the thresholds from the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to make a prima facie case against a merger that 
significantly increases labor market concentration. 
V. IDENTIFYING “HORIZONTAL” MERGERS IN LABOR MARKETS
Under conventional merger analysis a merger is “horizontal” if the merging firms 
are competitors in some relevant product and geographic market. The same principle 
applies to mergers threatening increasing concentration in the labor market. Such a 
                                                                                                                
• 35-2012 Cooks, Institution and Cafeteria 
• 35-2013 Cooks, Private Household 
• 35-2014 Cooks, Restaurant
• 35-2015 Cooks, Short Order 
• 35-2019 Cooks, All Other
121. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 158–59 (4th ed. 2005). 
122. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 43, § 3.6d. 
123. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TBL. A-12, UNEMPLOYED 
PERSONS BY DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2K7A-6RCK].  
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merger is horizontal if the two firms compete for hiring in the same labor market, 
whether or not they compete in the product market. A prima facie case against a 
merger that significantly increases labor market concentration can be made based on 
the HHI, independently of whether the merger would also increase concentration in 
the product market. 
Extreme product differentiation can complicate this analysis, particularly in cases 
where the products alleged to be competing use different inputs or technologies in 
their production. A well-known example in a product market is mergers involving 
firms that make metal cans with those that make glass bottles.124 While the two are 
interchangeable for many uses, such as commercial production of processed foods, 
they nevertheless exhibit significant differences in inputs, technology and production 
costs. These may qualify or even prevent one from concluding that the two are in the 
same relevant market for merger analysis. 
One way of approaching this problem is by considering whether a grouping of 
sales is an appropriate “collusive group”—that is, whether it is a group that could 
profitably reduce aggregate output and increase price.125 Indeed, most of the analysis 
in that portion of the Merger Guidelines that deal with concentration-increasing 
mergers presumes that the feared harms to competition will come from either 
collusion or some kind of coordinated interaction.126
Recent anti-poaching litigation can thus shed some light on the question of 
identifying mergers that are horizontal in the markets in which they purchase labor.127
                                                                                                                
124. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). 
125. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133 (2012); 
Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123 
(1992). The idea came from Kenneth D. Boyer, Industry Boundaries, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST LAW 70, 73 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988); and Gregory 
J. Werden, Is There a Principle for Defining Industries? Comment, 52 S. ECON. J. 532 (1985). 
See also Gregory J. Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipments Data in Defining Geographic 
Markets, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 719, 721 (1981) (“A market for antitrust purposes is any 
product or group of products and any geographic area in which collective action by all firms 
(as through collusion or merger) would result in a profit maximizing price that significantly 
exceeded the competitive price.”) (emphasis omitted). 
126. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 7.
127. See, e.g., In re VHS of Michigan, Inc., 601 F. App’x. 341 (6th Cir. 2015) (approving 
employee class action in case alleging that eight hospitals conspired to suppress nurses’ 
wages); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) (employees’ 
allegations of information exchanges sufficient to support claim of conspiracy to suppress 
wages of oil refining defendants); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (condemning 
agreement among NCAA colleges to limit salaries of junior basketball coaches); California v. 
eBay, Inc., No. 5:12–CV–05874–EJD, 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) 
(approving settlement in case alleging agreement among tech firms not to hire each other’s 
employees); In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(tech firms’ “non-poaching” agreement not to solicit one another’s employees; certifying 
employee class); Hall v. Thomas, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (excluding expert 
testimony concerning causation in case alleging that defendant unlawfully suppressed wages 
of workers in poultry processing plant); Reed v. Advocate Health Care, 268 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (complaint of hospital conspiracy to suppress nurses’ wages; denying class 
certification for failure to show impact by common proof); Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 
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“Anti-poaching” agreements are simply collusion by another name. They occur when 
employers agree with each other not to hire one another’s workers.128 A fundamental 
principle of market definition for merger analysis is that if two firms can profit by 
agreeing with one another to fix prices or divide markets, then they are in the same 
collusive group, which means that they should be treated as competitors for the 
purpose of merger analysis.129 This can occur in the labor market whether or not it
also occurs in the product markets of the firms who employ those workers.130
 For example, eBay has reached a settlement in a case charging eBay and Intuit 
with participating in an anti-poaching agreement.131 eBay is an auction site, mainly 
for third-party sellers of used and new merchandise. Intuit is primarily a 
manufacturer of computer software, including the popular programs Turbotax and 
QuickBooks, as well as a number of other programs that mainly provide accounting, 
payroll, or other management aids to businesses. The firms are not competitors in 
any product except in the trivial sense that a few eBay sellers offer programs such as 
Zoho or Xero that compete with Intuit’s QuickBooks and TaxAct or H & R Block 
Tax software that compete with Turbotax. But even for these, eBay functions merely 
as a broker. The two firms also have a very minor vertical relationship to the extent 
that a few third-party sellers also sell Turbotax or QuickBooks on the eBay auction 
site.132 Once again, eBay is merely the broker. 
But the hiring market is different, and the overlap between eBay and Intuit is 
sufficient that the two firms can profit from price fixing or market division 
agreements covering each other’s software engineers.133 As a result, a complete 
                                                                                                                
N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 2012) (rejecting most parts of claim that health insurer paid 
discriminatorily low reimbursement rates to chiropractors); cf. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 
301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (sustaining documented agricultural laborers’ complaint that 
fruit growers imported undocumented workers with intent of suppressing wages of 
documented workers); see also Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law 
and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015); Robert E. Bloch & Scott 
P. Perlman, Reed v. Advocate Health Care: Anatomy of Class Certification Proceedings in a 
Wage Conspiracy Case, ANTITRUST, Summer 2010, at 63. 
128. See ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME 
WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION (2018). 
129. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 22. 
130. Some anti-poaching agreements involve competitors in the product market as well. 
See, e.g., United States v. Lucasfilm, Inc., No. 10–02220 (RBW), 2011 WL 2636850 (D.D.C. 
June 3, 2011) (agreement between Lucasfilm and Pixar not to poach one another’s digital 
animators; court references the firms as “direct competitor[s],” referencing the product 
market). 
131. California v. eBay, Inc., No. 5:12–CV–05874–EJD, 2014 WL 4273888 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 29, 2014). 
132. In the vertical context, there has also been some discussion of possible anti-poaching 
agreements between Amazon and its own suppliers. See Eugene Kim, Amazon’s Aggressive 
Poaching Tactics in Israel Have Start-Ups Threatening to Abandon AWS, CNBC (Jan. 12,
2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/10/amazons-poaching-tactic-leads 
-lemonade-to-consider-ditching-aws.html [https://perma.cc/R368-YCL2].
133. See eBay, Inc., 2014 WL 4273888; see also In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig.,
985 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (certifying class action, in alleged no poaching 
agreement involving Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, Lucasfilm, and Pixar; the plaintiff 
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analysis of a (purely hypothetical) merger between eBay and Intuit would have to 
look at labor market overlap and concentration. On the product market side, one can 
assume that the investigating agency would quickly conclude that the merger does 
not provide any threat to competition. On the labor market side, however, they may 
find significant overlaps for different groups of specialized employees and, if 
concentration levels and the increase in labor concentration are sufficiently high, 
challenge the merger on that basis. As noted previously, the fact that eBay and Intuit 
have entered into a no-poaching agreement is alone sufficient to suggest that the 
employees subject to that agreement constitute a relevant market and that a merger 
between the firms would be anticompetitive. A merger between any two companies 
that have been shown to engage in anti-poaching agreements is prima facie 
problematic because of the fear of anticompetitive effects in the labor market. 
Additionally, however, a merger of two firms that are capable of profiting from such 
an agreement also raises competition concerns, whether or not they have actually 
engaged in an anti-poaching agreement. 
VI. THE RELEVANCE OF NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
A noncompetition agreement is between an employer and an employee and 
restricts that employee’s ability to work for a different employer in the event that the 
employee quits his or her job.134 The difference between a noncompetition agreement 
and a no-poaching agreement is that the former is purely vertical: it refers to 
agreements between a single employer and its various employees. The common law 
generally addressed employee noncompetition agreements under a rule of reason and 
generally upheld them if they were reasonably confined to a specified subject area, 
geographic range, and duration.135 The trend today is to treat pure noncompetition 
clauses under tort law or some other statute relating to employment practices.136
                                                                                                                
class members were identified as “software engineers”). The allegations also included claims 
of interlocking directorates between Apple and at least one director at the other companies. 
See Bill Singer, After Apple, Google, Adobe, Intel, Pixar, and Intuit, Antitrust Employment 
Charges Hit eBay, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2012, 10:36 AM), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/billsinger/2012/11/19/after-apple-google-adobe-pixar-google-and-intuit-antitrust 
-employment-charges-hit-ebay/#5b95024625bf [https://perma.cc/WCB3-DJCJ] (noting 
explicit no-poaching agreements involving Apple, Google, Adobe, Pixar, Intel, and Intuit, 
including circulation of a “do not call” list instructing employees with hiring authority not to 
contact the employees of the other participating companies). 
134. For a good legal survey of issues and policy, see J.J. Prescott, Norman D. BIshara & 
Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey 
Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369.  
135. For a recent example, see Innovation Ventures v. Liquid Mfg., 885 N.W.2d 861 
(Mich. 2016). The court did not discuss market power, which antitrust’s rule of reason 
requires. Although the courts have generally not recognized it, the market power at issue 
should be the power that the employer has in the employment market, which can be quite 
different from its power in the product market in which its sells. 
136. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee 
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS.
L.J. 107, 110–11 (2008). 
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Relatively few of them have been condemned under the federal antitrust laws.137 In 
any event, a purely vertical noncompetition agreement would also have to be treated 
under antitrust’s rule of reason.138
The historical justification for employee noncompete agreements is that they limit 
various forms of free riding.139 In particular, employees might receive costly on-the-
job training or knowhow that they could then port uncompensated to a different 
employer. Alternatively, an employee might learn trade secrets, including such 
things as customers lists, that could be shared with a new employer to the older 
employer’s detriment. As a result, the law of employee noncompetition agreements 
has frequently been assessed as a type of quasi-intellectual property protection.140
Today, however, employee noncompetition agreements are receiving far more 
critical reviews, with recent writing emphasizing the restrictions on employment 
mobility that they can impose.141 A White House Report issued in 2016 concludes 
that noncompetes, particularly among lower salary workers, can reduce worker 
welfare “and hamper the efficiency of the economy as a whole by depressing wages, 
limiting mobility, and inhibiting innovation.”142 Recently several states have enacted 
or considered legislation to limit the range of noncompete agreements or make them 
unenforceable.143
One noticeable and disturbing trend is toward the increased use of employee 
covenants not to compete by lower wage and less well-trained employees for whom 
the quasi-IP rationale is less tenable.144 This has resulted in pushback from several 
state courts.145 For example, prior to a 2017 settlement, Jimmy John’s, a fast food 
                                                                                                                
137. See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to 
condemn the defendant’s widespread use of employee noncompetition agreements as an 
attempt to monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
138. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (purely vertical agreement 
must be treated under rule of reason). 
139. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE 
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013) (stating and critiquing traditional justification). 
140. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 
(1999). For some empirical evidence that this use of employee noncompete agreements is 
counterproductive, see On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of 
Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013). See also LOBEL, supra note 139. 
141. E.g., OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NON-COMPETE 
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2016), https://www.treasury 
.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5V4R-LZE9]; KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 128. 
142. WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL 
ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 5 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites 
/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9Y6-CSFK].  
143. These are summarized in Yifat Aran, Note, Beyond Covenants Not to Compete: 
Equilibrium in High-Tech Startup Labor Markets, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 1245 (2018). 
144. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 128, at 8; Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, 
Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 24831, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24831.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TQC6-54MF].
145. On recent trends, see Garrison & Wendt, supra note 136, at 111–12. See also Jenna 
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franchisor that produces mainly sandwiches, required all of its employees to sign 
noncompete agreements.146 The agreements lasted for two years post termination and 
forbade a worker from accepting a job with any seller of “‘submarine, hero-type, 
deli-style, pita, and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches’ within two miles of any Jimmy 
John's location.”147 Because these covenants applied to all employees, it is highly 
unlikely that Jimmy John’s had any quasi-intellectual property rights, including 
customer lists148 or trade secrets, that justified the covenants.
Although employee noncompetition agreements are vertical, they can have 
horizontal effects, particularly if multiple employers in a labor market use them. As 
a result, they can be relevant to the analysis of horizontal mergers. While labor 
concentration indexes measure the range of competitive choices that employees face, 
noncompetition agreements serve to limit employee mobility within that range. Most 
significantly, they can serve to increase the level of effective market concentration 
to the extent that employees subject to such agreements face fewer competitive 
choices. To illustrate, suppose an employment market contains five firms, A, B, C, 
D, and E, and that they hire equal numbers of employees in a certain specialty. But 
suppose that the employees of two of the firms, A and B, are bound by noncompete 
agreements that effectively prevent the remaining three firms, C, D, and E, from 
bidding for their services. Assuming that the noncompete agreements are 
enforceable, existing employees of A and B are in a situation of monopsony, since 
there is only one employer that can hire them for the present job function. 
From the point of view of the employers, this situation is not quite the same as 
one in which only three firms in the market are able to compete. While C, D, E cannot 
compete away existing employees of A and B, firms A and B can compete to hire 
employees away from C, D, E. That is, a noncompetition agreement prevents a rival 
firm from competing for the employees of the firm imposing the restraint, but it does 
not limit that firm from hiring the employees of other firms who are not bound by 
such agreements. As a result, we would not simply recompute market concentration 
to count only the three unencumbered firms. For example, in a merger of C and D, 
two firms that do not use noncompetes, firms A and B would still be able to bid for 
their employees, meaning that they should be counted as in the market. 
Rather, we would count the widespread existence of noncompetition agreements 
as an exacerbating factor in reducing competition in the labor market that calls for 
                                                                                                                
L. Brownlee & Caitlin A. Kelly, To Compete or Not to Compete: Illinois’ Movement to 
Eliminate Noncompete Agreements, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1233 (2017). 
146. See Brunner v. Liautaud, No. 14–c–5509, 2015 WL 1598106 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2015) 
(approving nonantitrust complaint alleging inter alia unreasonably broad noncompete 
agreements by Jimmy John’s); Matthew Hector, Jimmy John’s Settles Suit over Noncompete 
Agreements, 105 ILL. B. J., no. 2, Feb. 2017, at 14. 
147. Viva R. Moffat, Human Capital as Intellectual Property? Non-Competes and the 
Limits of IP Protection, 50 AKRON L. REV. 903, 909 (2016). 
148. To the extent that fast food franchises sell to customers on demand, customer lists 
seem relatively unimportant. 
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closer scrutiny.149 It should thus be added to other factors mentioned in the Merger 
Guidelines as affecting the significance of a given concentration level.150
VII. THE EFFICIENCY DEFENSE AND LABOR MARKET MERGERS
While section 7 of the Clayton Act does not expressly create an “efficiency 
defense” against prima facie unlawful mergers, both recent case law and the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize such a defense.151 At the same time, 
however, situations in which merging firms have successfully defended a prima facie 
unlawful merger by showing the requisite efficiencies are rare. 
Under the approach laid out in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the 
government first makes out a prima facie case that a merger is likely to result in an 
anticompetitive price increase in at least one affected market.152 This prima facie case 
contains a built-in allowance for the “ordinary” efficiencies that are reasonably 
expected to result from a merger.153 The form that the allowance takes is typically an 
adjustment of the concentration standards so as to be more tolerant than the structural 
factors would otherwise indicate.154 As a result, predicted levels of anticompetitive 
harm to consumers already assumes that the merger will produce unspecified 
“ordinary” efficiencies. So once the prima facie case has been made out, only 
additional or “extraordinary” efficiencies can be used to rebut the prima facie case.155
Given that this efficiencies “allowance” seems to be very generous, it is not 
surprising that few proponents of mergers are able to show extraordinary efficiencies. 
Indeed, recent literature indicates that merger policy is, if anything, underdeterrent 
and has permitted several mergers that have resulted in actual price increases.156 This 
                                                                                                                
149. In addition, authorities may seek modification of existing noncompetition agreements 
or to limit the enforceability of noncompetes executed prior to a company’s merger. See
William Vorys, Unreasonable State Restrictions on Business Transactions: The 
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154. See Crane, supra note 153, at 365. 
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could be the result of concentration thresholds that are too generous to the merging 
firms,157 but it could also be because the approach taken in the Guidelines gives the 
firms a greater efficiency credit than their merger actually produces. 158
The 2010 Guidelines do offer a statement about the magnitude of proven 
efficiencies: they must be sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the post-merger 
price will be no higher than pre-merger prices.159 As a result, the net harm to 
consumers must be zero. For example, if structural evidence predicts a 20% price 
increase from a horizontal merger after “ordinary” efficiencies are taken into 
account,160 then the defendants must show efficiencies that are sufficient to reverse 
that increase and that these efficiencies will be passed on to the consumer.161 The 
result must be that the predicted post-merger price is no higher than the prices 
charged prior to the merger. While the government has the obligation to make out its 
prima facie case, the burden for the efficiency defense is on the merging firm or 
firms.162 This is a sensible assignment of the burden of proof, since firms are in the 
best position to understand the efficiencies likely to result from their own merger.163
Significantly, this approach represents an incorporation of a consumer welfare 
standard, which will not tolerate any price increase at all. By contrast, under a general 
                                                                                                                
157. Earlier editions of the Merger Guidelines identified markets as “highly concentrated”
when the HHI exceeded 1800. The 2010 Guidelines moved that number to 2500. All versions 
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162. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court 
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First the government must show that the merger would produce a firm controlling 
an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result[] in a 
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market. Such a showing 
establishes a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition. 
To rebut the presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that show[s] 
that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger's] 
probable effects on competition in the relevant market. If the defendant 
successfully rebuts the presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing 
additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and 
merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the 
government at all times. 
Id. at 715; see also Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust 
Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919, 1927 (2015). 
163. See Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, supra note 151, at 724–26.
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welfare standard a price-increasing merger would be tolerated, provided that the 
efficiency gains exceeded consumer losses from reduced output and higher prices.164
Virtually any type of productive efficiency can be used to prove the efficiency 
defense, provided that it is “merger specific”—that is, that the defendants can also 
show that this particular efficiency could not readily be attained except by the 
merger.165 This means that transactional efficiencies count, just as much as pure 
engineering or other production cost efficiencies. For example, if the merging firms 
can show that after the merger they can negotiate for supplies in larger volumes and 
thereby obtain lower prices, that evidence could support a successful efficiency 
defense. If the particular supply market is competitive, then the only likely effect of 
the claimed efficiency is resource savings. For example, if two Italian restaurants in 
a small community should merge and can show that they can purchase tomatoes in 
larger quantities at a lower price, that would count in favor of the merger. The Italian 
restaurants serve a local market, which we assume is highly concentrated. By 
contrast, they purchase tomatoes in a much larger and competitively structured 
market and certainly do not have the power to suppress the output of tomatoes by 
reducing the price they are willing to pay. Any lower price results from a reduction 
in transaction costs that accompany larger scale purchases. 
By contrast, when the merging parties have a strong position in the market in 
which they are purchasing, and the supply market is not as competitive, then this 
claimed “efficiency defense” may be nothing more than monopsonistic price 
suppression. In the general run of product markets, the difference between efficient 
reduction in transaction costs and monopsonistic price suppression is that output 
increases under the former but decreases under the latter. Further, because 
monopsony represents an exercise of market power, one must be able to infer that 
the allegedly monopsonized market is sufficiently noncompetitive to make this 
exercise plausible. 
To take another example, Amazon is a major retailer with a reputation as a hard 
bargainer for the products that it purchases for resale.166 It sells automobile tires, 
which are presumably sold in a national or larger geographic market. Its share of 
online tire sales is 8%, however,167 and online tire sales constitute only 6% of the 
total tire market, indicating that if the market is all tire sales Amazon has perhaps 
one half of one percent.168 In that case any lower wholesale price that Amazon is able 
to obtain for tires is not likely to be monopsonistic, but rather an efficient reduction 
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in purchasing costs. By contrast, Amazon accounts for roughly 83% of the e-book
downloads in the United States, with much of the balance shared by Apple (9%) and 
Barnes & Noble (4%), along with several smaller firms. Those numbers make claims 
of monopsonistic price suppression more plausible.169
In the case of labor, resorting to quantity or “bulk” discounts is probably not a 
feasible efficiency, because each worker sells his or her labor individually. Indeed, 
employers more typically obtain lower wages by breaking unions, thus forcing 
individual bargaining, rather than entering into collective bargaining with them. One 
could argue that hiring more people can save companies some human resources 
costs, but these would show up as administrative costs, not as lower wages or salaries. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence does not offer strong support for economics of 
scale in hiring: in fact, the opposite is often found, with hiring costs increasing rather 
than decreasing with the number of workers hired.170
The most plausible efficiency defense would be to argue that an efficient 
reorganization of production will lead to the firm’s needing fewer workers, i.e. lower 
labor inputs. Therefore, the firm would be required to demonstrate how the 
reorganization will lead to the same or greater output with significantly fewer 
workers. For example, a merger might enable a firm to adopt a labor-saving 
technology. Alternatively, it may enable the post-merger firm to eliminate costly 
duplication, particularly in distribution, accounting, or other divisions whose labor 
could be spread across the entire post-merger firm. This efficiency must be 
demonstrated for the specific labor market where anticompetitive effects are likely 
to occur according to the prima facie case. For example, it does not help the company 
to show that it is saving on the number of accountants needed if the anticipated 
anticompetitive effects are on the market for nurses.171  
The D.C. Circuit’s Anthem decision involved a merger among health insurers that 
the government challenged as anticompetitive in two geographic markets.172 The 
defendants, which operated managed care programs, bargained with various 
physician groups, hospitals, and other health care providers for coverage, which it 
then priced out to consumers through health care premiums.173 The defendants 
offered to show that, as a consequence of the merger, they would be able to bargain 
for lower rates from some of the providers.174 The court majority rejected this 
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efficiency defense as inadequately proven.175 A dissenting judge would have found 
the proof of efficiencies adequate, but he also acknowledged that the evidence could 
indicate “monopsony power in the upstream market where Anthem-Cigna negotiates 
provider rates with hospitals and doctors.”176 The majority had also agreed that if the 
lower rates actually reflected an exercise of monopsony power in the merging firms’ 
supply markets it would not constitute a defense.177 That position is also reflected in 
the Merger Guidelines, which refuse to recognize as an efficiency “anticompetitive 
reductions in output or service.”178
But in the case of labor market supply, how does one tell the difference between 
efficient bargaining that reduces costs and monopsonistic reductions in labor supply? 
Is the ability to obtain a lower rate from providers an “efficiency defense” or merely 
an exercise in monopsony power? Here, the basic economics of monopsony can be 
helpful, although perhaps not decisive in every case. If the labor supply market is 
unconcentrated and the merging firms purchase only a small portion of it, then they 
probably lack the power to exercise monopsony power in that market. They would 
be more like the two Italian restaurants in the previous example, who operate locally 
in the market in which they sell but purchase tomatoes in a very large market.179 In 
that case, bargaining for lower rates is very likely efficient. By contrast, if the labor 
demand market is concentrated and the merging firms account for a high proportion 
of it, that at least raises the inference that their ability to obtain lower rates results 
from a reduction in competition for the purchase of labor rather than any bargaining 
efficiencies. To the extent output is measurable, that evidence can also be helpful: 
efficient reductions in transaction or bargaining costs will tend to increase output 
while monopsonistic suppression of wages will tend to reduce it. 
There is also the problem of “offsets,” or whether consumer harm in one market 
can be offset by efficiency gains in a different market. In its Philadelphia Bank
decision the Supreme Court said no,180 and that outcome seems consistent with the 
statutory language which provides that a merger is unlawful if it harms competition 
in “any” line of commerce and section of the country. Importantly, since the harm 
and the benefits occur in different markets, we would effectively be asking one set 
of consumers to pay the price of an anticompetitive merger, while another set would 
enjoy the efficiency benefits. Further, making quantitative assessments of benefits in 
one market and harms in a different market would place heroic demands on the 
courts.181
Adding labor market effects could serve to complicate this analysis. For example, 
suppose a merger is challenged as anticompetitive in a labor market but the merging 
firms offer evidence that the merger will lead to reduced costs in the product market 
in which they sell. Once again, they would be asking the court to tolerate an 
anticompetitive outcome in one market, labor, for the benefit of a different group 
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who purchases in the product market. Existing law would not countenance such an 
approach, nor as a general matter should it.182
VIII. MEASURING “CONSUMER WELFARE” EFFECTS IN LABOR MARKETS
The defining attribute of the consumer welfare standard is the elimination of 
monopoly: eliminating monopoly entails higher output and, in the case of output 
restraints, lower prices. For example, under the consumer welfare standard, merger 
law does not recognize an efficiency defense unless the efficiencies are so substantial 
that they reduce the profit-maximizing price of the post-merger firm to a level that is 
no higher than the pre-merger level. As a result, it does not accept “tradeoffs” that 
tolerate increased monopoly power and actual output decreases, provided there are 
offsetting gains in productive efficiency.183 Properly defined, the consumer welfare 
standard applies in exactly the same way to monopsony. Its goal is high output, which 
comes from the elimination of monopoly power in the purchasing market. 
The monopsony case can sow some confusion, however, because suppressed 
buying prices are low rather than high. In some cases, an exercise of monopsony 
power in the labor market will also harm consumers in the product market. This will 
occur when the post-merger firm has market power on both sides of the market. In 
that case, exercising market power on the labor side will entail the purchase of less 
labor. Ceteris paribus, less labor will lead to less output on the product side. If the 
firms have power on that side, the result would be higher product prices as well, and 
consumer harm is obvious. 
The consumer welfare principle also guides cases when the two firms are not 
competitors at all in the product market. For example, in the hypothetical eBay/Intuit 
merger discussed above,184 the acquisition does not reduce competition between the 
two firms in the product market. However, because the two firms will hire fewer 
software engineers (or other affected employees), they will very likely produce less 
in the product market. Assuming the firms have some power in the product markets 
in which they sell, product prices would go up as well, even though the firms are not 
product market competitors. The general language of section 7 of the Clayton Act 
counts this as a qualifying injury to competition, although to date no court of which 
we are aware has recognized it. That is, even though the merger does not increase 
concentration in any product market, it does result in a product price increase. In 
some cases, a merger may lead to a wage decrease without a decrease in output. After 
a merger, workers may still be willing to work for the merging firm because their 
next best alternative is worse than working at the lower wage. Hemphill and Rose185
explain how a merger of buyers (such as employers) can lead to a decrease in 
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bargaining leverage for sellers (such as workers), without necessarily entailing a 
decrease in output. In this case, there is merely a transfer away from workers and 
towards the merging firms. Yet, they argue that such a transfer is a harm for antitrust 
law as it results from a reduction in competition.186 Thus, they argue that antitrust 
law should protect the welfare of the merging firms’ trading partners, be they 
consumers, workers, or other suppliers.187
In sum, when consumer welfare is properly defined as targeting monopolistic 
restrictions on output, it is well suited to address anticompetitive consequences on 
both the selling and the buying side of markets, and those that affect labor as well as 
the ones that affect products. In cases where output does not decrease, the 
anticompetitive harm to trading partners can also be invoked. 
CONCLUSION
Horizontal mergers threatening labor market competition present a significant 
competition problem and several legal issues that have not previously been explored. 
Labor market concentration—measured by the HHI for employers recruiting in a 
given labor market—seems to be very high, as high or higher overall than product 
market concentration. This suggests that a mature policy of pursuing mergers 
because of harmful effects in labor markets could yield many cases, although prima 
facie we do not know how many. Also significant is that some of these mergers might 
be horizontal in the labor market but not in the product market in which the merging 
firms sell their goods or services. Once again, we do not predict the extent to which 
this is true, but it does suggest that those reviewing mergers cannot simply assume 
that lack of competition in the product market entails the same for the labor market. 
So to say that merger analysis focusing on labor will take evaluators into uncharted 
territory seems clear, and perhaps even more so for courts.  
At the same time, however, we are not recommending any significant changes in 
the economic analysis applied to mergers. The mechanisms of market definition, 
measurement of concentration, the construction of prima facie cases based on 
concentration effects, and assessments of consumer welfare, can readily be adapted 
to merger cases involving labor markets. The fundamentals remain the same. 
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